Engineering & Inventions · Design & invention
Why a system with backups still fails
Every defense has holes, and the holes move. See why an accident needs several of them to line up, how spare parts make failure look almost impossible on paper, and how a backup can leave a system less safe.

What you will learn
- Describe the Swiss cheese model and say what the slices and the holes stand for
- Explain why a single weakness usually isn't enough to cause an accident
- Tell an active failure from a latent one in an account of an accident
- Say what the model changes about where an investigation looks
Lesson 1 of 4 · 5 min
How Swiss cheese explains why accidents happen
Say a hospital protects its patients with an alarm, a checklist, a nurse who double-checks and a pharmacist. A patient still gets the wrong drug. How do four safeguards all fail on the same day?
The psychologist James Reason, of the University of Manchester, gave an answer that safety engineers still use. Picture each safeguard as a slice of Swiss cheese. It's called the Swiss cheese model of accidents.
Each slice is a real defense, such as an inspection, an alarm, a checklist, a trained operator or a physical guard. Each hole is a weakness in that defense.
Two features of the picture matter most. First, every slice has holes, because no defense is perfect. Second, the holes move. Reason wrote that, unlike the holes in real cheese, they keep opening, shutting and shifting. A weakness comes and goes with time pressure, understaffing, fatigue and faulty equipment. So you can't find it once and close it for good.
Stacking the slices is what makes the system safe. A hazard that slips through a hole in the first defense usually meets the second. One lapse isn't enough to cause harm, so no defense is a single point of failure.
An accident happens when the holes in every slice momentarily line up. Reason called that a trajectory of accident opportunity, a straight path through all the defenses at once. The path exists on one particular day. It was never a standing gap that anyone could have walked up to and noticed.
So the model treats an accident as a coincidence of ordinary weaknesses. Nobody has to find the one broken part. Airlines, hospitals and oil companies all use the idea. Computer security calls it defense in depth.
Try to recallAn investigation finds that an alarm was muted, a checklist step was skipped and a supervisor was covering two areas at once. How does the Swiss cheese model read those findings?
It reads them as three holes that happened to line up. They aren't three rival causes with only one real one. Each was a weakness in a separate defense. A muted alarm alone should have been caught by the checklist, and a skipped step should have been caught by the supervisor. The accident needed all three at once, so the useful question is what opened each hole that day.
The next time a report blames an accident on one mistake, count the defenses that mistake had to get past. The Swiss cheese model says each one had a hole that day. The useful question is what opened each of them.
Lessons in this topic
How Swiss cheese explains why accidents happen
Every defense has holes. In the Swiss cheese model, harm gets through only when the holes in several defenses line up at the same moment.
The mistake on the day and the one made months before
An active failure is the slip you can see on the day. A latent failure is the earlier decision that set it up, and it changes where an investigation should look.
The math that makes backups look almost perfect
A bridge carries more cable than it needs, and three flight computers vote. See the two kinds of redundancy and the one assumption the arithmetic rests on.
How a backup can make a system less safe
Identical copies share identical flaws, extra safety devices add complexity, and a backup can tempt everyone to push harder. See how redundancy backfires.
Three quick stories from this topic
Blameless lapses
In aircraft maintenance, about 90% of quality lapses have been judged blameless
The psychologist James Reason cited the figure against blaming individuals for accidents. Slips are like mosquitoes, he wrote. You can swat them one by one and they keep coming, so the lasting fix is to drain the swamp they breed in.
Two kinds of failure
An active failure is the slip on the day. A latent failure is an earlier decision, such as storing two similar drug boxes side by side, that lies dormant until it sets the slip up.
Where an investigation looks
Retraining the person who slipped leaves the trap in place. Reason observed that the same circumstances provoke similar errors whoever is on duty.
Holes that line up
Hospitals and airlines model accidents as holes lining up in slices of Swiss cheese
Each slice is a defense, such as an alarm or a checklist, and each hole is a weakness in it. Unlike the holes in real cheese, these open, shut and move. Harm gets through only at the moment they line up in every slice.
Accidents need the holes to line up
The system produces failures when the holes in every slice momentarily align, letting a hazard pass through all of them along a trajectory of accident opportunity.
Widely used, and criticized too
The model has been applied to aviation safety, process safety, healthcare and layered security. It's also been criticized for being used too broadly and without enough other models or support.
One bar, one bridge
A crack a tenth of an inch deep in one steel bar brought down the Silver Bridge in 1967
Each link of the chain holding up the bridge had only two bars, so when one snapped the other couldn't carry the load. The bridge fell into the Ohio River at rush hour and 46 people died. Investigators said a third bar per link might have prevented it.
Fracture-critical
Engineers call a structure fracture-critical when a single broken part can bring all of it down. The Brooklyn Bridge's cables have more than 5,000 wires each, so losing one changes almost nothing.
What spares assume
Three parts that each fail one time in a thousand fail together once in a billion, but only if they fail independently. Two power supplies in one socket don't.
Sources
- Swiss cheese model, Wikimedia Foundation
- Human error: models and management, BMJ
- Silver Bridge, Wikimedia Foundation





