Philosophy & Ethics · Mind, identity & free will
The mind-body problem
A thought seems nothing like a brain cell, yet each affects the other. Compare the view that mind and body are two things with the views that mind is the brain, or is what the brain does.

What you will learn
- Explain what the mind-body problem asks and why dualism appeals
- Explain the interaction problem for dualism and how dualists reply
- State the identity theory's claim and its lightning comparison
- Explain how two terms can differ in meaning yet name the same thing
Lesson 1 of 4 · 4 min
Two things or one, and the princess who asked how
Stub your toe and you feel a sharp pain. A neuroscientist would describe nerve fibers firing and signals reaching the brain. The pain, though, doesn't seem to be made of cells or have a size or place. The mind-body problem asks how those two descriptions fit together.
The first answer is dualism, the view that mind and body are different kinds of thing. René Descartes held that the mind is a substance whose nature is thinking, and the body a substance whose nature is to take up space. A substance, for him, is something that can exist on its own.
Dualism also fits everyday experience. The world reaches your mind through your senses, and your thinking shapes what you say and do. So it seems mind and body act on each other. That two-way traffic is called interaction, and philosophers note a natural prejudice in its favor.
A milder version, property dualism, says there's only one kind of stuff but it has two kinds of property, physical and mental. Many philosophers today reject Descartes's two substances but take property dualism seriously.
In May 1643 a 24-year-old exiled princess, Elisabeth of Bohemia, wrote to Descartes. How, she asked, can a soul that is only a thinking thing move the body to act?
Her point was sharp. Everything known to push or move things did it by contact or shape, and both need size and place. Descartes's mind has neither. In June she wrote that it would be easier to grant the mind matter and extension than to grant an immaterial thing the power to move a body. Descartes's answer was evasive.
Try to recallWhat is the interaction problem for dualism, and how do dualists answer its modern form?
If the mind has no size or place, it's unclear how it could move the body, since pushing seems to need contact or extension. Today the worry is that a non-physical push would break the conservation of energy. Dualists reply that conservation holds only for closed systems, and a body acted on by a mind isn't one.
Dualism says mind and body are different things, which fits how pain and thought seem. Its weak spot, pressed by Elisabeth in 1643, is explaining how a mind with no size or place could move a body.
Lessons in this topic
Two things or one, and the princess who asked how
See why it feels natural to think mind and body are different things, and the question about moving an arm that dualism has never fully answered.
Pain as a brain process, like lightning as electricity
Meet the 1950s theory that every mental state simply is a brain state, and see how it answers the complaint that "pain" doesn't mean "brain process".
The mind as software that could run on anything
Learn why functionalists define a mind by what it does rather than what it's made of, why octopuses matter to the argument, and the objection it still faces.
Do your thoughts do anything? Two radical answers
See why some philosophers worry that mental causes do no work at all, and why others conclude that beliefs and desires don't exist.
Three quick stories from this topic
The princess's question
In 1643 a 24-year-old princess asked Descartes a question dualists still struggle with
Elisabeth of Bohemia asked how a mind with no size or place could move a body. She wrote that it would be easier to give the mind matter than to give an immaterial thing that power.
Why it bites
Everything known to push things did it by contact or shape. Descartes's mind had neither.
Still open
The modern version asks how a non-physical push fits the conservation of energy.
The octopus argument
Octopuses helped persuade philosophers that pain can't be one particular brain state
In 1967 Hilary Putnam noted that mammals, birds, reptiles and even octopuses seem to feel pain. Their nervous systems differ so much that they're unlikely to share one physical pain state.
Multiple realization
If many physical states can carry pain, pain can't be identical to any single one.
Mind as software
Functionalists define pain by its role, so it could run on neurons, silicon or something stranger.
The mind as steam whistle
T. H. Huxley compared consciousness to a steam whistle that does nothing to move the train
In his 1874 essay he argued that mental events are by-products of the brain. They're caused by it but cause nothing in return, like the whistle's noise or a clock's chime.
Epiphenomenalism
The view that the mind is a side effect with no physical effects has a name, epiphenomenalism.
Why it returns
If brain states do all the causal work, mental states seem to have nothing left to do.
Sources
- Dualism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Type physicalism, Wikipedia
- Elisabeth of Bohemia, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Elisabeth of the Palatinate, Wikipedia
- Multiple Realizability, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Epiphenomenalism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy





