Philosophy & Ethics · Mind, identity & free will
The hard problem of consciousness
Science can explain how the brain sorts and reports information. Why any of it is felt is another question. See what makes that question hard, the cases built to show it, and the main replies.

What you will learn
- Tell the easy problems of consciousness apart from the hard problem
- Explain what Nagel's bat shows about the limits of describing a mind from outside
- Lay out Frank Jackson's knowledge argument and the conclusion he drew from it
- Compare the main replies that keep the mind physical despite the Mary case
Lesson 1 of 4 · 5 min
What it's like to be a bat
Look at a ripe tomato. Your eyes pick up the light, your brain sorts it from green, and you can say "red". There's also the way the red looks to you. In 1995 the philosopher David Chalmers argued these are two different questions.
He called the first kind the easy problems. How does a brain tell colors apart, focus attention, report what it sees, or switch between sleep and waking? Each is a job, so you explain it by finding the mechanism that does the job. Chalmers said getting the details may take a century or two, but science knows how to start.
The hard problem is why doing those jobs comes with experience at all. All that processing could, it seems, go on in the dark, with no inner feel. The gap between the mechanism and the feeling is called the explanatory gap.
In 1974 the philosopher Thomas Nagel asked what it is like to be a bat. He said a creature is conscious if there is something it is like to be that creature, for the creature itself.
Bats are mammals, so Nagel took it as given that they have experience. Most find their way by sonar. They shriek at high pitch and read the echoes, which tell them the distance, size, shape and texture of things. Nagel said this sense works like nothing we have.
You can imagine having webbed arms, catching insects at dusk and hanging upside down all day. Nagel said that only tells you what it would be like for you to act like a bat. It doesn't tell you what it's like for a bat to be a bat.
That's the problem for an outside description. Science describes things in terms anyone can check from any point of view. Experience seems tied to one point of view. Nagel didn't conclude the mind isn't physical. He said we don't yet understand how it could be. Daniel Dennett replied that anything important about bat experience could be studied from outside.
Try to recallWhy did Thomas Nagel use a bat, and not a dog, to make his point about experience?
A bat is a mammal, so it surely has experience, but it perceives mainly by sonar, a sense unlike any of ours. So you can't build up what sonar is like from your own case. That leaves a fact about the bat's experience that an outside description doesn't seem to reach.
You can now separate the jobs a brain does from the question of why doing them feels like something, and say why a bat's sonar makes that second question hard to answer from outside.
Lessons in this topic
What it's like to be a bat
Learn the difference between explaining what a brain does and explaining why it feels like something, and why a bat's sonar makes that difference hard to ignore.
Mary sees red for the first time
Follow the scientist who knows every physical fact about color but has never seen it, and weigh what she learns, if anything, when she walks out of her room.
Could you have a zombie twin?
Meet the philosopher's zombie, a perfect physical copy of you with no inner life, and see why its bare possibility would sink physicalism and how critics push back.
Ways out of the hard problem
See the boldest answers on offer, that experience is built into matter or that the feeling of it is an illusion, and the scientist's case for studying consciousness without solving the puzzle first.
Three quick stories from this topic
A real-life Mary
A vision scientist who never saw color said studying it never showed him what color is
Knut Nordby, born in Oslo in 1942, was completely colorblind and saw red as a very dark grey. He built a thorough knowledge of the physics of color and the cells that detect it. He wrote that none of it helped him grasp the true nature of colors.
Mary outside the story
Philosophers point to Nordby as a real case like Frank Jackson's imagined Mary, a color expert who has never seen color.
What he could know
Nordby knew the facts about wavelengths and receptors. He said they left out what colors are like to see.
The not-so-easy problems
The man who named the easy problems of consciousness guessed they could take centuries
David Chalmers's easy problems include how the brain focuses attention, reports what it sees and tells sleep from waking. He guessed the details might take a century or two. He still called them easy, because science knows how to attack them.
Easy means solvable
Each easy problem is a job, so you solve it by finding the mechanism that does the job.
The hard one
The hard problem is why doing those jobs comes with experience at all. No mechanism for a job seems to answer it.
The talking zombie
A philosopher's zombie would talk about its own feelings exactly as you do
It's defined as your exact physical copy with nothing going on inside. So it makes every sound you make, including "I love that smell!" over fresh coffee. Some imagined zombies even spend their time discussing consciousness.
Why it talks
Its body and brain match yours atom for atom, so its behavior matches too. Only the experience is missing.
Why it matters
If such a copy is even possible, physical facts don't settle whether experience exists, and physicalism would be false.
Sources
- Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1995), David Chalmers, consc.net
- What Is It Like to Be a Bat? (Philosophical Review, 1974), Thomas Nagel, text at philosopher.eu
- What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, Wikipedia
- Vision in a complete achromat, a personal account, Knut Nordby, in Night Vision (Cambridge University Press, 1990), text at consc.net
- Qualia: The Knowledge Argument, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Zombies, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy





